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"In Terrorem" Ne Terreamus
By HuGo M. PFALTZ, JR.*
The hallmark of contemporary estate planning is that it is
planned. One quickly senses the effort which has been devoted
to such planning in the awesome volume of material which has
been published on the subject and which continues unabated.
Much of this literature is extremely particularized, and it is easy
to wonder whether the popular search through the labyrinth of
the Internal Revenue Code for often insignificant tax savings
isn't degenerating into estate over-planning.1 Nevertheless, there
can be no doubt that thorough estate planning is absolutely neces-
sary to insure the orderly transmission of accumulated property.
The concept of thorough estate planning implies that maximum
advantage has been taken of all of the legal arrangements which
are available to achieve a testator's objectives. Thus, estate plan-
ning involves more than the mechanical application of stan-
dardized formulae or the incorporation of the latest tax saving
scheme. It is axiomatic that estates must be treated individually,
and those engaged in estate planning should be prepared to
draw upon all available legal techniques in order to attain in-
dividual objectives. Some of these available techniques receive
only scant recognition in contemporary literature relating to
estate planning. This article considers one of these little recog-
nized estate planning devices, the in terrorem clause, and sug-
gests that, in the proper circumstances, the clause deserves to be
brought out of its present obscurity.
* Member, Essex County, New Jersey State and American Bar Associations.
A.B. 1953, Hamilton College; LL.B., 1960, Harvard.
I See, e.g., A Unique Tax Parlay-Insurance Gifts With Strings, P-H Practicing
Attorneys Letter, July 17, 1963. This article shows in detail how a potential tax
saving may be obtained by augmenting the federal estate tax marital deduction
through an inter vivos transfer of life insurance to a charitable institution while
retaining an incident of ownership to cause its inclusion in the computation of a
decedent's adjusted gross estate. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042. The practical
application of such a device is limited to charitably minded possesors of relatively
large estates. Moreover the effect of adding property to the estate of the surviving
spouse will often overcome any immediate tax saving.
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The in terrorem clause, as its name implies, is intended to
terrorize. Specifically, it is intended to terrorize into acquiescence
those who might otherwise contest an estate disposition. Typically
the in terrorem, or no contest, clause is a provision inserted in a
will which provides that if any beneficiary contests the will such
person shall forfeit the gift which has previously been provided
by the testator.2 Under such a provision an estate beneficiary is
presented with a choice of either accepting the gift which has
been given or hazarding the gift on the speculation that by
upsetting the testator's estate plan such person will gain even
more. If the contesting beneficiary is unsuccessful and the in
terrorem clause is applied, his gift will be forfeited. If he is
successful in his contest, the in terrorem provision is disregarded
and such beneficiary takes the share of the estate which is
otherwise provided by law. Thus, the typical in terrorem clause
is a forthright and heavy-handed weapon. It leaves a beneficiary
with an initial choice whether the gamble is worth the potential
gain. Its in terrorem effect may be assessed by comparing the
risk of loss with the opportunity for gain.
It should be noted that an in terrorem provision is merely one
method of creating a conditional bequest, in this case a bequest
conditional upon acquiescence in the testator's over-all estate
disposition.' A decision to incorporate an in terrorem provision
in a will does not involve considerations of public policy. Assum-
ing that a testator is free to withhold his bequest in the first
instance, the addition of a condition upon subsequent conduct
should not be of public concern so long as the conduct which the
clause seeks to control does not violate public policy. As one
court observed:
This [the in terrorem provision] was a matter of concern to the
testator and his beneficiaries exclusively; the public interest
was not involved. Testamentary dispositions are required to
be enforced unless contrary to public policy or rule of law.
Only a paramount public interest would warrant such abridg-
ment of the inherent right of testamentary disposition.4
2 Suggested in terrorem provisions designed to avoid estate litigation will be
found in 13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms § 13:2246-77 (1957); 3 Jones, Legal Forms
§ 67:100 (1962); 9A Nichols, Cyclopedia of Legal Forms § 9.117a-e (1963).
3 See, Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398 (1898); South
Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 Adt. 961 (1917); Elder v. Elder,
84 1R.I. 13, 120 A.2d 815 (1956).
4 Alper v. Alper, 2 N.J. 105, 114-15, 65 A.2d 737, 741 (1949).
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While the traditional application of the in terrorem clause
may appear unsophisticated, the clause may be applied with
finesse to achieve specialized results. For example, in order to
mitigate its rigors, the clause may merely demand that a will
contestant bear the costs of such contest.5 To broaden its scope,
the clause can provide that the beneficiaries must acquiesce in the
discretionary decisions of executors or trustees and not meddle
in the continuing management of the estate.( Likewise, the
effective coverage of the clause can be extended to include a
forfeiture where a particular disposition is contested by a non-
beneficiary, who, although having no direct interest in the estate,
may be coerced into submission by the collateral effects of a
forfeiture.7
A further sophistication of the in terrorem clause is a provision
declaring that any beneficiary who asserts a claim against the
estates or who contests a disposition of particular property on
the ground that it did not belong to the testator 9 will forfeit the
gifts provided in the will. Such an application of the in terrorem
clause is analogous to the equitable doctrine of election under
which a beneficiary is obliged to choose between accepting a
legacy or asserting an inconsistent claim.'0 While the in terrorem
clause, when so applied, may be analogous to such an election,
G E.g., Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N.J. Eq. 388, 7 AUt. 856 (Ct. Err. & App. 1886),
reversing Hoyt v. Hoyt, 40 N.J. Eq. 478, 2 At. 451 (Ch. 1886). But c. f., In re
Vom Saal's Will, 82 Misc. 531, 145 N.Y. Supp. 307 (Sur. Ct. 1913), where a
court voided on grounds of public policy a provision shifting the costs of litigation
to a party in a will construction suit, distinguishing a provision shifting the costs
of a contest against the probate of a will.
6 A clause prohibiting intermeddling has been upheld in England. Adams
v. Adams [18921 1 Ch. 369. However, no American decision was found which
directly considers such a provision against intermeddling, although it would
appear that such a continuing condition might be inferred from the language of
some in terrorem clauses. See In re Lummins Estate, 126 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. N.J.
1954). The American Law Institute takes the position that a forfeiture based on
such a clause will be enforced where a beneficiary raises a contest without
probable cause. Restatement, Property § 431 (1944). But c.f., Cohen v. Reisman,
203 Ga. 684, 48 S.E.2d 113 (1948) (clause would violate ublic policy if
applied in suit to compel executors to carry out provisions of will); see aiso In re
Vom Saal's Will, supra note 5, refusing to charge contesting party with costs of
will construction suit; language of in terrorem clause involved apparently would
apply to continuing management of trust.
7 E.g., Alper v. Alper, supra note 4, affirming 142 N.J. Eq. 547, 60 A.2d 880
(Ch. 1948).8 E.g., Rogers v. Law, 66 U.S. 253 (1861); In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384 220
Pac. 301 (1923); In re Von Grimm's Will, 133 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
9 E.g., Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, supra note 3.
10 For consideration of the equitable doctrine of election, see 5 Bowie-Parker,
Page on Wills § 47 passim (1962).
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there may often be a significance in the choice of alternative
methods of accomplishing the same result. For example, a will
provision requiring an election implies that the claimant has
something to elect and can give dignity to what otherwise
could be a relatively weak claim. A general in terrorem clause
may raise no such implication.
A classic application of the in terrorem clause is illustrated in
Perry v. Rogers," decided by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in
1908. According to the opinion in this case, it appears that one
W. M. Perry had been married four times and had at least
eleven children by three of his marriages. His estate consisted
primarily of his community property interest in Texas farm lands.
Apparently his basic estate planning problem was to make
adequate provision for his children and yet preserve the economic
viability of these farms. The lands were acquired as community
property during his marriage to his first wife, who had since died.
As a result, her heirs-his children by the first marriage-held a
one-half undivided interest in the same farms. In order to effect
a satisfactory division of the properties, it would be necessary
to compel the children of his first marriage to acquiesce in his
estate plan. Faced with this problem, the testator provided in
his will that these lands should be divided into roughly equal
parcels for the benefit of his respective family units. In each case
the devised parcels were described by their metes and bounds.
Anticipating that his partition might not be acceptable to all,
he also inserted a clause in the will which stated:
If at any time any should attempt or should proceed in chang-
ing or breaking my aforesaid will, then it is my wish and
desire that the half interest that I hold and possess in all my
estate, both real and personal, be given and I hereby bequeath
the same to my present wife for the benefit of my sons Oscar
D. and Lewis Perry, sons of my present wife by me.12
The children by his first marriage did contest his disposition, and
the court duly applied the in terrorem clause to effect a forfeiture
in favor of the children by his fourth marriage.'3
1152 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 114 S.W. 897 (Ct. Civ. App. 1908).
12 Id. at 595, 114 S.W. at 899.
13 The fact that the in terrorem clause had to be applied by the court means
that it was ineffective in its purpose of avoiding dispute. As will be noted
subsequently the anatomy of the in terrorem clause can only be seen in cases
which attest to its failures.
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Litigation over an estate disposition is undesirable. The very
existence of litigation means that the estate plan has failed in
its objective of assuring the orderly transmission of property.
Moreover, the cost of a lawsuit may deplete an estate, while
delay resulting from legal dispute can cause considerable hard-
ship to its beneficiaries. Not only will the estate be subject to
expenses for attorney's fees and court costs; but the collateral
effects of litigation may be disastrous, for example, where the
lawsuit results in reducing the share of an estate which qualifies
for the federal estate tax marital deduction. 4 Another undesirable
consequence of litigation may be that it will bring to public
attention matters which a testator or estate beneficiaries would
prefer to keep private. Such a desire to avoid publicity is seen in
In re Simson's Estate,'5 where a decedent left his widow the sum
of ten thousand dollars, while providing that the bulk of his estate
should be given to a Miss Barry Brady. This estate disposition
would inevitably invite public comment, and apprehension of
such publicity may have motivated the testator to include an
in terrorem provision in his will.
While litigation may have serious consequences to an estate
plan, there are many desirable estate dispositions which invite
dispute, especially in the proper domestic context. Thus, Perry
v. Rogers,16 which has previously been cited as a classic applica-
tion of the in terrorem clause, presented domestic factors, re-
sulting from the testator's four marriages and eleven children,
which provided the elements for internecine litigation. Other
domestic re-arrangements may equally create fertile ground for
14 See Case v. Roebling, 42 N.J. Super. 545, 127 A.2d 409 (Ch. Div. 1956)
in which the court noted that the interpretation of a will sought by one set of
contesting estate beneficiaries would cause the imposition of $1,462,301.55 in
additional taxes by reducing the marital deduction all-owed to the estate.
16 123 N.J. Eq. 388, 196 AtI. 451 (Prerog. 1938). Apparently the testator
believed that the bequest which he provided for his widow, when coupled with
an in terrorem clause providing for its forfeiture to Miss Brady in the event that
his will was contested, might avoid publicity concerning his estate disposition.
Unfortunately, his son, a non-beneficiary, filed a caveat against the probate of his
will, which caveat was dropped after a compromise was arranged with Miss
Brady. So far his disposition had caused no significant publicity. However, the
whole transaction was brought into court in order to determine whether the
$10,000 bequest passed from the testator to his widow and was subject to the
lower transfer inheritance tax rate applicable to transfers between spouses or
whether a forfeiture had been effected, so that the $10,000 passed to Miss Brady,
who was not related to the decedent. Thus, the best prepared plans can go
astray. As has previously been noted, the in terrorem clause can only be seen in
its failures.16 Supra note 11.
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contesting an estate disposition. Today, in deference to the
federal estate tax marital deduction, 7 it is common for an estate
plan to give a testator's widow a general power of appointment
over one-half of his adjusted gross estate. Where a testator has
been married previously and where his children are the issue of
his prior marriage or marriages, it is easy to recognize that
relations may be strained between such children and his current
spouse. In this setting, an estate plan which attempts to take
maximum advantage of the estate tax marital deduction may be
regarded by the children as a diversion of their patrimony. A
lawsuit which may reduce the marital gift can cost them nothing,
since they are unlikely to be the beneficiaries under the general
power of appointment held by their step-mother. With nothing
to lose and the possibility to gain at the expense of their
supposed family interloper, the stage is set for litigation. Unfor-
tunately, such a lawsuit may wreak havoc to an estate plan.
In view of the threat which potential litigation poses to the
effective achievement of an estate plan, it might be assumed that
the in terrorem clause would occupy a significant place in the
law and lore of estate planning. On the contrary, the in terrorem
clause occupies only a very minor role in contemporary estate
planning.
The in terrorem clause is not a recent innovation of the com-
mon law; the application of the clause to avoid will contests has
been traced in England back to the seventeenth century.i The
clause has also received long standing recognition under Ameri-
can law,'9 although one state, Indiana, has a statutory prohibition
which voids an in terrorem provision purporting to work a
forfeiture for contesting a will or seeking to prevent its admission
to probate.20
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
18 Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90, 23 E.R. 668 (Ch. 1688).
19 The earliest American case found enforcing a forfeiture for contesting an
estate disposition is Breithaupt v. Bauskett, 1 Rich. Eq. 465 (S.C. 1845). In this
case a testator had given his mistress and illegitimate children a greater share of
his estate than allowed by law. He provided that any devisee who should
disturb or interfere with this arrangement should forfeit all rights under his will.
The provision was upheld, but the association is hardly auspicious. Compare,
Unger v. Lowey, 202 App. Div. 213, 195 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1922), revd on other
grounds, 236 N.Y. 73, 140 N.E. 201 (1923).2 0 Ind. Ann. Stats. 6-602 (Bums 1953). Apparently this statutory prohibi-
tion does not completely eliminate the application of the in terrorem principle in
(Continued on next page)
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While the clause has been generally recognized, there are
relatively few decisions involving its application.21 Professor Olin
L. Browder, Jr., who examined this area of the law in 1988,
observed that American courts have given only limited treatment
to the clause,22 and he noted further that more than two-thirds of
these decisions had been rendered since 1900.23 It is not sur-
prising to find that there are few judicial decisions involving the
in terrorem clause, since its purpose is to prevent litigation. Court
decisions involving the clause are necessarily instances where the
clause has been ineffective. Thus, one might conclude that the
absence of reported cases involving the in terrorem clause is mute
testimony to its general effectiveness. At least it is logical to
conclude that case decisions are an inadequate gauge with which
to test the clause.
If the absence of judicial decisions involving the in terrorem
clause is evidence of its potency, it might be supposed that the
clause would receive extensive recognition among commentators
on estate planning. However, such an assumption is not borne
out by the evidence. Those who are concerned with estate plan-
ning give little recognition to the in terrorem clause. For example,
the latest edition of Page on Wills, published in 1962, devotes a
scant seven pages to the in terrorem clause as a condition against
contest of a will, and these pages are more than half occupied
by footnotes.24 Almost as much text space is devoted to the
legal status of a murderer as devisee and heir of his victim.2 5
Similarly, other authorities give little serious consideration
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Indiana. See, Doyle v. Paul, 119 Ind. App. 632, 86 N.E.2d 98 (1949), rehearing
denied, 119 Ind. App. 632, 87 N.E.2d 885 (1949).
21 Reported decisions involving the in terrorem clause will generally be found
digested under Wills, key number 665 in the West digest system. One can easily
become familiar with all reported decisions in the respective decennial digests.22 Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1066
(1938).
23 Ibid. One contemporary commentator states that lawyers are requested to
insert "no contest" clauses in wills with more frequency today than in the past.
Kertz, Contesting a Will in the Face of a Forfeiture Clause, 45 Geo. L.J. 200(1956-57). Perhaps some circumstantial evidence is available to support this
statement. E.g., Nichols, Cyclopedia of Legal Forms, supra note 2, now contains
more than twice the textual material and forms on the subject than its predecessor
volume. 9 Nichols, Cyclopedia of Legal Forms § 9.1273 (1936).24 5 Bowie-Parker, Page on Wills § 44.29 (1962). An additional three-
quarters of a page is devoted to the clause as prohibiting claims against a
testator's estate. Id. § 44.24.
25 Id. §§ 17.19, 17.20.
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to the in terrorem clause other than to acknowledge its existence.20
Perhaps the most complete examination of the subject in treatise
form is found in part 27 of the American Law of Property, which
is devoted to illegal conditions and limitations as applied to
property interests.27
Considering the treatment which the in terrorem clause has
received at the hands of legal scholars, one might conclude that
the clause is deemed an illegitimate child of the common law,
whose existence must be recognized but which need not be
promoted in polite legal society. For reasons which will be
considered further it is submitted that this analogy is fitting.
Once it is seen that the in terrorem clause has been relegated
to the legal demimonde in spite of its apparent usefulness, it is
appropriate to examine some of the reasons for its disrepute.
Such an examination may lead to a proper evaluation of the
significance of the clause.
The present low estate of the in terrorem clause is partially
a result of guilt by association. It has already been noted that
the in terrorem clause as applied to will contests is only one aspect
of the general subject of conditional testamentary gifts.2  Con-
ditional gifts are not favored by the law, and whenever possible
testamentary language will be interpreted to create absolute
rather than conditional bequests.29 Similarly, the clause attempts
to invoke a forfeiture, and it is hardly necessary to repeat the
legal truism that forfeitures are not favored by the law and
provisions in a will causing a forfeiture will be strictly construed. 30
Moreover, the in terrorem principle is often associated with
attempts to establish illegal conditions or as an inducement to
26 See e.g., Atkinson, Wills 408-10, 412-13, 813 (2d ed. 1953) (almost the
same amount of text is allocated to inheritance by murderers from their victims.
Id. at 153-56); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 983 (1957) (more space is devoted to the
capacity of murderers and the like to inherit from their victims. Id. § 104);
Casner, Estate Planning (3d ed. 1961) (Professor Casner dismisses the clause with
only a footnote among the 1,750 pages of his treatise. Id. vol. I. 53 n. 11. How-
ever, it should be noted that the 1963 supplement to the treatise more than
doubles the textual space allocated to the clause. Id. 1963 Suppl. 11 n. 11.).
276 American Law of Property §§ 27.3-27.11 (1952). This part was
written by Professor Olin L. Browder, Jr., whose investigations of the in terrorem
clause have been cited previously. See note 22 supra. For other research by this
scholar see Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-Examined, 49
Colum. L. Rev. 320 (1949).
28 See cases cited note 3 supra.
29 See e.g., Kibbe v. City of Rochester, 57 F.2d 542 (D.C. W.D. N.Y. 1932).
30 See, e.g., Saier v. Saier, 366 Mich. 515, 115 N.W.2d 279 (1962).
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conduct in violation of established public policy.31 Where the
in terrorem principle appears to impinge on public policy, courts
have sometimes avoided the true policy questions involved by
deciding that the clause was intended only to terrorize and not
to work any actual forfeiture.
However, if all that marred the in terrorem escutcheon was its
association with illegal attempts to invoke the in terrorem prin-
ciple, its tarnished reputation could be brightened by referring
to the clause as a condition against will contest or by similar
designations which contemporary commentators on the subject
seem to favor.3" It is, however, submitted that the clause is
regarded with apprehension for reasons which run deeper than
its dishonorable associations.
Another factor tending to discredit the in terrorem clause is
its treatment by the courts. As previously observed in this
article, the clause has received only limited judicial consideration,
and even such scant recognition has been inconsistent.34 It is
true that the few reported decisions concerning the clause raise
unresolved questions. However, reported decisions often involve
poorly drafted clauses. Thus, for example, a court is compelled
to devine a testator's intention in order to determine what
conduct constitutes a violation of a clause providing a forfeiture
in the event that anyone is "dissatisfied" 35 with a will or in the
event that there is any "disputing" 0 a will. Even if the clause is
clearly drafted, there may be a serious question as to its intended
scope.37 It has been held that merely filing a caveat against the
probate of a will does not constitute a contest,38 although a con-
trary result has also been reached. 39 It is generally held that a
31 See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 129 N.J. Eq. 444, 20 A.2d 21 (h.
1941), in which the court refused to enforce a provision in a testator's will
providing for a forfeiture in the event that certain brothers and sisters of the
testator were to communicate or live under the "same roof" with each other.3 2 E.g., Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28 So. 2d 881 (1946); In re McArdle's
Will, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N.Y. Supp. 764 (Sur. Ct. 1933) (clause only intended
to terrorize in absence of gift over in the event of contest).33 See, e.g., Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest, supra note 22.
34 Ibid.
35 In re Hickman's Estate, 308 Pa. 230, 162 AUt. 168 (1932).30 Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, supra note 3.
3 7 Annot. What constitutes contest or attempt to defeat will within provision
thereof forfeiting share of contesting beneficiary, 49 A.L.R.2d 198 (1956).3 8 E.g., Wells v. Menu, supra note 32.
39 Cross v. French, 118 N.J. Eq. 85, 177 AU. 456 (Ch. 1935).
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suit for construction of a will containing an in terrorem clause is
not a contest.
40
Undoubtedly the greatest area of legal doubt concerns the
extent to which forfeiture will be enforced where the con-
testant had "probable cause" to bring the contest, even though
such action was unsuccessful. It has previously been seen that
a testator is free to condition his bounty upon his beneficiaries'
acquiescing in his estate disposition. Thus, public policy is not
concerned with a testator's initial choice to incorporate an in
terrorem provision in his will, and favors enforcing testamentary
dispositions in accordance with a testators wishes. However,
sound public policy also requires that estate dispositions be in
accordance with the law, and this policy may be defeated where
an in terrorem clause terrorizes into silence beneficiaries who
have probable cause to raise a legal contest.41 As a result of this
conflict of policies, there is disagreement among American courts
whether a forfeiture should result under an in terrorem clause
where there was probable cause for contest.42 The American Law
Institute attempts to reconcile this conflict of policies by declaring
that the existence of probable cause will not avoid a forfeiture
under an in terrorem clause where the contest was brought on the
"typical" grounds of fraud, lack of testamentary capacity or undue
influence; conversely, where the contesting party had probable
cause to believe that there had been a subsequent revocation of
the contested will or that it constituted forgery, there will be no
forfeiture.43
4 0 E.g., Dravo v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 267 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1954).
But see, Federal Trust Co. v. Ost, 120 N.J. Eq. 43, 64, 183 Ati. 830 840 (Ch.
1936), where one court warned a litigant that she had come "perilously near to
violating an in terrorem clause by arguing for a construction of a will which would
have resulted in an intestacy under which she would receive more than the share
given to her by the will.
41 For considerations of the public policy questions raised where a contestant
has probable cause see, South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, supra note 3; Com-
ment, No-Contest Will Clauses, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 762 (1957).
42 Frdecisions imposing a forfeiture without regard to the existence of
probable cause see, e.g., In re Kitchen, supra note 8; Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass.
490, 160 N.E. 882 (1928). For decisions holding that the clause will not be
enforced where a contest was brought for probable cause see, e.g., Ryan v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 235 N.C. 585, 70 S.E.2d 853 (1952); In re Keenans
Will, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N.W. 1001 (1925). In England a forfeiture is not
imposed where the contestant had good cause for the contest. Powell v. Morgan,
supra note 18; see also In re Williams, [1912] 1 Ch. 399.
43 Restatement, Property § 428 (1944); see also id. § 429 for provisions con-
cerning forfeitures where contest involves judicial or statutory limitations on the
devolution of property.
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In addition to questions raised by existing court decisions,
there are other forseeable problems which may be created by
including an in terrorem clause in an estate plan. These problems
transcend the question of forfeiture and the immediate bene-
ficiaries of the plan. An example of such a problem is the impact
of an in terrorem clause on the qualification of assets for the
federal estate tax marital deduction. Under Treasury Regulations,
property acquired by a surviving spouse as a result of a con-
troversy involving a decedents estate will be regarded as having
"passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse" only if the
assignment or surrender of such property was a bona fide recogni-
tion of enforceable rights of the surviving spouse.44 How would
these regulations be applied if a will contest were initiated by a
testator's children involving a will which provided for a forfeiture
in favor of his surviving spouse in the event of such a contest,
and the contest were later settled privately by consent? To what
extent might the Commissioner open up the question of probable
cause if the local law of the testator's domicile would not enforce
a forfeiture where probable cause existed for the contest?
Conversely, if it suited his purposes, might not the Commissioner
contend that upon instituting the contest the whole estate had
been forfeited to the surviving spouse and that any property
thereafter acquired by the contestants was received from the
spouse rather than the decedent?45 This article has previously
cited a New Jersey decision in which the court permitted the
State Tax Commissioner to make such a collateral investigation
in order to establish that the institution of a will contest by a non-
beneficiary caused a forfeiture of a bequest originally given to the
decedents widow. 46
But, concern that courts are inconsistent in their application
of the in terrorem clause or that a violation of the clause may
create collateral problems is no reason for discounting the clause
itself. The purpose of an in terrorem clause is prophylactic not
44 Tres. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d)(2) (1958).
45Sueh a contention might be advantageous for the Commissioner where the
surviving spouse died shortly after the testator in order to cause inclusion of such
property in the spouses estate as a transfer in contemplation of death. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2035. Such a rationale could also be employed to support the
imposition of a gift tax. See, Housman v. Comm'r, 105 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1939),
affirming 38 B.T.A. 1007 (1938), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 565 (1940).46 1n re Simson's Estate, supra note 15.
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curative. It is intended to avoid litigation, and not to remedy
the damage which litigation causes. In those cases where a
contest arises in spite of the existence of an in terrorem provision,
the clause has failed to fulfill its function, and it may matter little
that the clause is inconsistently applied, at least for the estate
involved.
It is submitted that the true reason for the in terrorem clause's
disrepute lies in its very essence. The clause is intended to negate
the judicial process by terrorizing into submission those who
might otherwise seek assistance from the courts. It is a juris-
prudential antichrist. Moreover, it is an antichrist which requires
the aid of the church in propagating its heresy. The clause
demands that the judicial system, which it seeks to avoid,
penalize the person who invokes the very procedures which the
system provides. If the in terrorem principle were allowed to
occupy a significant place in law, it would threaten the existence
of its very creator. The law cannot allow its own Frankenstein
monster to run at large, and thus the in terrorem clause is
strictly confined.
In somewhat analogous situations involving the right of free
contract, courts have struggled with the question of the extent
to which the law will enforce bargains which are designed to
remove a contract from the judicial system whose aid is sought.
Judicial decisions involving this question have, as might be
expected, been inconsistent, just as judicial decisions involving
the in terrorem clause have been inconsistent4
While the in terrorem principle must play a restrained role
in the legal system, the in terrorem clause is sanctioned in the
estate planning field. Because of its very negative aspect, it is
extremely difficult to evaluate its effectiveness even in this
circumscribed area. The relatively few decisions which are
found dealing with the clause are all cases involving the failure
of the clause. They attest to the ambiguous draftsmanship of a
47 See, e.g., Smith v. McDonald, 87 Cal. App. 503, 174 Pac. 80 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1918) (enforcing agreement that contract should become void if a party
commenced legal action); James v. Vernon's Pools [1938] 2 All Eng. L. Rev. 626(K.B.) (upholding express provision in contract against legal enforcement of
bargain). But see contra, Farmers Bank v. Bass, 218 Ky. 813, 292 S.W. 489(1927) (refusing to enforce contract provision which would cut off right to appeal
court decision); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Cormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892) (diegarding
terms which prohibited party from raising legal objections to agreement.).
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particular clause or the temerity of a beneficiary. It is impossible
to assess the value of the in terrorem clause where it has been
effective, because such situations necessarily have not come
within the purview of the judicial system. The value of the
clause is not subject to scientific proof. It is also submitted that
its negative essence and the fact that the effectiveness of the
in terrorem clause may not be demonstrated by scientific proof
causes an emotional rejection of the clause among treatise
writers and others who are steeped in the traditional legal
system.
However, one should not need scientific proof to conclude
that the possibility of forfeiture may be a strong deterrent to
litigation. The very inconsistency in judicial application of the
in terrorem clause can be an important factor in inducing po-
tential litigants to compromise their differences. Indeed, it would
be a rash counselor who would not advise moderation to his
client when confronted with a well drafted clause designed to
avoid the very contest which is contemplated.
The purpose of this article has been to focus attention on the
in terrorem clause. The in terrorem clause is admittedly a highly
specialized tool, but there are situations where the threat of
litigation may necessitate employing the most specialized tech-
niques in order to prepare an estate plan which will avoid the
disasters of forseeable litigation. Where such a situation exists,
it is suggested that those who plan estates should not, themselves,
fear the in terrorem clause.
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